COMMENTS
HELLING REVISITED:
IS IT TIME TO FUNCTIONALLY DISPATCH WITH THE SOCIAL
TOLERANCE PRONG OF THE ETS EXPOSURE CLAIMS?
*

John J. Rolecki

I. INTRODUCTION
It is now clearly established that the deleterious effect of second1
hand smoke is a matter of public interest and concern. Since the release of the 1986 United States Surgeon General’s report detailing
the harms of smoking, state and local legislatures have been quite active in creating measures to control secondhand smoke and protect
2
the rights of non-smokers in society. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court made the unprecedented decision to consider a prisoner’s extreme exposure to secondhand smoke unconstitutional as
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amend3
ment of the Constitution. This landmark ruling of Helling v. McKinney recognized a theory of harm beyond that with which the Eighth
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Student, University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2011; Master of Bioethics, University
of Pennsylvania, 2011. Thanks to Professor Ruger for providing helpful advice for this
discussion.
See Patrick Kabat, Note, “Till Naught but Ash Is Left To See”: Statewide Smoking Bans, Ballot
Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 128, 130 (2009) (noting the increase in smoking regulations in the past millennium); see also Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., 1226, 1226
(2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5745.pdf (analyzing the
mortality rates, years of potential life lost, and productivity losses resulting from smoking); Fact Sheet: Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Jan. 1993), http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/pubs/etsfs.html (concluding “that
the widespread exposure to environmental tobacco smoke in the U.S. present a serious
and substantial public health risk”); Secondhand Smoke, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_
smoke/general_facts/index.htm (last visited May 11, 2011) (discussing the health effects
of secondhand smoke).
E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986); see also Kabat, supra
note 1 (presenting a survey of current legislation intended to curb public smoking).
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
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4

Amendment typically dealt. With this ruling, the Court extended
Eighth Amendment protection to a situation where the plaintiff—a
prisoner—neither lacked basic human necessities nor sustained posi5
tive present injury, or even certain future harm. Commentators have
regarded the ruling as the Court’s acceptance of secondhand smoke
as a serious health concern, as well as a signal to legislatures to regu6
late prison atmospheres accordingly.
Eighteen years have passed since Helling came down from the Supreme Court. In the interim, the scientific and social consensus that
environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”) is positively harmful has crys7
tallized. It is no longer legitimate to argue, as did the United States
in its Helling amicus brief, that ETS exposure should not constitute
harm because “[s]moking is widespread in society, and millions of
8
people are exposed to its secondary effects on a daily basis.” Accordingly, some commentators have called for a minimum standard of
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See Jacqueline M. Kane, Note, You’ve Come a Long Way, Felon: Helling v. McKinney Extends
the Eighth Amendment to Grant Prisoners the Exclusive Constitutional Right to a Smoke-Free Environment, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (1994) (discussing how Helling held that future health
risks can comprise an Eighth Amendment claim).
Cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (declaring excessive force against prisoner
as definitively falling under Eighth Amendment protection); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (determining Eighth Amendment applicable to deprivations of “essential food, medical care, or sanitation”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–106 (1976)
(finding Eighth Amendment violation when basic medical care was withheld from prisoner).
See, e.g., Matthew H. Kraft, Note, Second Hand Smoke as Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Helling v. McKinney: The Insurmountable Burden of Proof and the Role of the Court, 3 GEO.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 257, 278–79 (1994) (stressing the Court’s standard as flexible and
cautious in the face of scientific uncertainty and societal divide).
See, e.g., IRA J. CHASNOFF & JEFFREY LINK, AM. MED. ASS’N, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE: OFFICE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION (2008), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/433/environmental-tobaccosmoke.pdf (setting forth in pamphlet form a set of goals for clinicians pertaining to ETS,
including increasing physician knowledge and awareness, as well as direction on how to
counsel patients and families on tobacco exposure reduction); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
PROTECTION FROM EXPOSURE TO SECOND-HAND TOBACCO SMOKE 2 (2007), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2007/9789241563413_eng.pdf (prescribing a
comprehensive set of policy recommendations for achieving smoke-free environments).
See generally The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the
Surgeon General, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (June 27, 2006), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/secondhandsmoke/
(containing full 2006 Surgeon General’s Report, as well as extensive links to information
on the dangers of secondhand smoke).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (No. 91–1958), 1992 WL 12012062.
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9

air quality for prisons. Our heightened knowledge of the effects of
ETS has led to some dissatisfaction concerning Helling’s approach to
determining whether ETS exposure in a prison constitutes cruel and
10
unusual punishment.
In accordance with traditional Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Helling test has subjective and objective components. Subjectively, the plaintiff must show that authorities were deliberately indiffe11
rent to the harm being sustained; this Comment does not deal with
this aspect of the Helling test. Objectively, the plaintiff must show that
12
he is sustaining unreasonable and scientifically cognizable harm.
Beyond an objective, scientific determination of sustained harm,
however, the test further requires a determination of the extent of
ETS exposure tolerated by society and subsequently an analysis of the
plaintiff’s sustained exposure relative to that benchmark of societal
13
ETS tolerance. This Comment argues that the social tolerance inquiry of the Helling test, though consistent with Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, is unethical and legally inefficient in light of current
knowledge of the harms of ETS exposure. Once a plaintiff establishes the occurrence of scientifically unreasonable exposure, the right of
a prisoner to be free from unreasonable ETS exposure should not
turn on a litigated conception of what level of ETS exposure society
would choose to tolerate. By merging the objective harm and social
tolerance inquiries and assuming, justifiably, that society would not
tolerate anyone being forcibly subjected to a scientifically dangerous
level of ETS, courts would recognize the recent shift to a presumptively ETS-intolerant society. Further, such a merger would obviate
the necessity of relying upon a diffuse third party’s opinion to determine the appropriate air standards for a given prisoner. Beyond
yielding conceptual and ethical dividends, the changed approach to
9

10

11
12
13

See Scott C. Wilcox, Note, Secondhand Smoke Signals from Prison, 105 MICH. L. REV. 2081,
2101 (2007) (suggesting judicial and legislative remedies for Eighth Amendment violations).
See Kraft, supra note 6, at 272–79 (noting the scarcity of research on ETS in 1994 and the
resultantly "insurmountable" standard of proof for prisoners); see also Elizabeth Alexander & David C. Fathi, Smoking, the Perception of Risk, and the Eighth Amendment, 13 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 691, 692–93, 704 (1994) (analyzing the creation of the social tolerance
prong in Helling and labeling it a "pyrrhic victory for prisoners"); Wilcox, supra note 9 at
2094-97 (prescribing proper approach to the Helling standard in light of current research and attitudes regarding ETS). Wilcox approves of Helling (as do I), but shows
concern for updating the mode of the application of its standard due to shifting social
views and improved research data.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
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the Helling test would also eliminate duplicative litigation and lower
evidentiary burdens for pro se litigants bringing claims of this type.
II. HELLING V. MCKINNEY: A GATEWAY TO THE RECOGNITION OF LEGAL
HARM FROM COMPELLED ETS EXPOSURE
When the Supreme Court decided Helling in 1993, the general
public was not well informed about the connection between ETS exposure and future harm. The Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) had that very year released a landmark report classifying ETS
as a class A carcinogen, or a substance known to cause cancer in hu14
mans. Tobacco companies reacted quickly to discredit the damag15
ing report. In addition to political maneuvers to discredit the EPA
report, the tobacco companies also filed a lawsuit against the gov16
ernment with the intent of having the report formally vacated. The
initial lawsuit succeeded in doing this, as a North Carolina District
Court judge ruled that the EPA had exceeded its authority and vi17
olated procedural mandates in developing the 1993 report. The decision in that case would stand for nine years, until vacated by the
18
Fourth Circuit in 2002. In the meantime, however, the case stood as
a powerful tool for the tobacco companies to foster doubt about the
1993 report. Accordingly, public understanding of the causal link be19
tween ETS and future harm developed slowly, though legislatures
20
were increasingly moving to outlaw smoking in public places.
14

15

16
17
18
19



U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING, at 1–1
(1993), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/ets/etsindex.cfm (“ETS is a human
lung carcinogen, responsible for approximately 3,000 lung cancer deaths annually in U.S.
nonsmokers.”).
See Monique E. Muggli et al., The Tobacco Industry’s Political Efforts to Derail the EPA Report on
ETS, 26 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 167, 167–77 (2004) (detailing the tobacco industry’s
reaction to the 1993 EPA report).
Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 466 (M.D.N.C.
1998), vacated 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 466.
Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 313 F.3d at 862.
With the EPA’s 1993 report under legal scrutiny, activity in medical journals was important for increasing public awareness of ETS harmfulness. See, e.g., Victor M. Cardenas et
al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer Mortality in the American Cancer Society’s
Cancer Prevention Study II, 8 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 57, 57–63 (1997) (finding results
that “agree with the EPA summary estimate that spousal smoking increases lung cancer
risk by about 20 percent in never smoking women”); Hari H. Dayal et al., Passive Smoking
in Obstructive Respiratory Diseases in an Industrialized Urban Population, 65 ENVTL. RES. 161,
161–71 (1994) (finding passive smoking as a “significant risk factor” for obstructive respiratory disease); George Howard et al., Active and Passive Smoking Are Associated with Increased Carotid Wall Thickness: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study, 154 ARCH
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The key to finding a prisoner’s ETS exposure level unconstitutional would be to concretize the connection between the ETS exposure and future harm. Cases preceding Helling had established that,
for Eighth Amendment purposes, inmates’ basic human needs must
21
be satisfied, including a condition of “reasonable safety.” Many cases had approved a remedy for unsafe conditions prior to the materia22
lization of a harmful event. Consequently, the Eighth Amendment
had expanded to cover situations in which current practices clearly
placed the prisoner in danger of future harm. Important cases of this
type included remedies for a failure to provide proper medical care
to prisoners, on the theory that withholding such care would result in
23
a lingering discomfort somewhat akin to actual torture. At this time,
however, the idea of future harm manifesting as a direct result of ETS

20
21

22

23

INTERNAL MED. 1277, 1277–82 (1994) (finding a significant increase in carotid artery inter-medial thickness in men exposed to increasing hours of ETS exposure per week); David J. Howard et al, Environmental Tobacco Smoke in the Workplace Induces Oxidative Stress in
Employees, Including Increased Production of 8-Hydroxy-2’-Deoxyguanosine, 7 CANCER
EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 141, 141–46 (1998) (finding evidence suggesting that exposure to ETS in the workplace causes “oxidative stress, resulting in DNA
damage and potentially increasing the risk of certain diseases”); J. Trédaniel et al., Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Risk of Lung Cancer: The Epidemiological Evidence, 7
EUR. RESPIRATORY. J. 1877, 1877–88 (1994) (surveying available studies and stating that
“the causal association between ETS exposure and lung cancer now seems wellestablished; however, its public health impact is still debated”); A. Judson Wells, Passive
Smoking as a Cause of Heart Disease, 24 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 546, 546–54 (1994) (concluding that “passive smoking increases the coronary death rate among U.S. never smokers by
20%, to 70%”). But see Gio Batta Gori, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Coronary Heart
Syndromes: Absence of an Association, 21 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 281, 281–95
(1995) (asserting that “[b]y scientific standards, the weight of evidence continues to falsify the hypothesis that ETS exposure might be a CHD [coronary heart disease] factor”); S.
Hockertz et al., Acute Effects of Smoking and High Experimental Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) on the Immune System, 10 CELL BIOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 177, 177–90
(1994) (“[O]ur data do not favor immunosuppression and the possibility of increased
risk of infection in nonsmokers exposed to ETS under real-life conditions.”); Geoffrey C.
Kabat et al., Relation Between Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer in
Lifetime Nonsmokers, 142 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 141, 141–48 (1995) (finding “little indication of an association of environmental tobacco smoke with lung cancer in nonsmokers”).
See Kabat, supra note 1, at 194–99 (tabulating existing ETS legislation including effective
date of operation).
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); see also
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (finding it “cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions”).
See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prisoner
need not actually be assaulted before gaining relief); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303
(5th Cir. 1974) (entitling inmates to relief under Eighth Amendment when their personal safety was threatened by the removal of electrical wiring and the commingling of diseased prisoners).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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exposure was relatively attenuated and insufficient to show legal causation.
A brief overview of the facts of Helling are helpful to understand
how the Supreme Court approached the case and came to apply an
Eighth Amendment analysis to ETS exposure cases. In 1987, when
the case first arose, William McKinney was incarcerated in the Nevada
24
State Prison. McKinney filed a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that he had been assigned to a cell with an inmate
25
who smoked five packs of cigarettes per day. McKinney alleged that
because of his compelled exposure to the accompanying cigarette
smoke, he suffered from nosebleeds, headaches, chest pains, and a
26
lack of energy. McKinney sought monetary damages, an injunction
prohibiting defendants from housing him with smoking inmates, and
27
attorney fees. The magistrate to whom the District Court delegated
the issue analyzed McKinney’s claims in two regards: First, whether
an inmate has a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment,
and second, whether the guards at his facility had been deliberately
28
indifferent to McKinney’s medical needs. The District Court ulti29
mately rendered a directed verdict against McKinney. On appeal
the Ninth Circuit held that “even if an inmate cannot show that he
suffers from serious, immediate medical symptoms caused by exposure to ETS,” compelled exposure could be cruel and unusual punishment if it posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the inmate’s
30
health. The Supreme Court first granted certiorari to the case from
the Ninth Circuit to mandate that the Court undertake the subjective
analysis of whether prison authorities demonstrated “deliberate indif31
ference” to the plaintiff’s situation. The Court again took the case
on appeal after the initial remand to clarify the entirety of the test to
32
be applied to prisoner ETS claims. This latter Supreme Court decision came down in 1993; this Comment analyzes the present application of the test the Court then directed to be utilized in Eighth
Amendment ETS exposure cases.
As stated, by 1993, some courts had entertained arguments of serious harm resulting from ETS exposure, but others were hesitant to
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993).
Id.
McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1502 (9th Cir 1991).
Id.
Id. at 1503.
Id.
Id. at 1503–04.
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1993).
Id. at 30–31.
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find an immediate causal connection between ETS exposure and se33
rious physical harm. Indeed, this was McKinney’s main hurdle at
34
the outset of his lawsuit. Against this backdrop, the argument of the
United States as amicus in Helling that “the harm to any particular individual from exposure to ETS is speculative, that the risk is not sufficiently grave to implicate a ‘serious medical nee[d],’ and that exposure to ETS is not contrary to current standards of decency,” is not
35
markedly inappropriate.
The Helling Court, however, disagreed,
and found that compulsory ETS exposure in prison could violate the
Eighth Amendment as an unreasonable danger to health, provided
that the plaintiff could satisfy all components of the test put forth by
36
the Court.
The Helling test uses objective and subjective components to determine whether the ETS exposure rises to a violation of the Eighth
37
Amendment.
The subjective component of the test for Eighth
Amendment suitability of prison conditions requires that the prisoner demonstrate “deliberate indifference” on behalf of the prison au38
thorities. This standard is divorced from any consideration of the
extent of the harm of ETS, as it seeks to ensure that prison officials
are not punished for the existence of improper conditions of which
39
they had no knowledge.
The objective component of the Helling test attempts to judge
whether the ETS exposure is sufficiently grave as to warrant the key
finding of causation between current practices and likely future
40
harm. This question of causation, in the case of latent harm and
scientific uncertainty, is necessarily quite grey. The test requires that
the prisoner show that his or her “future health [has been] unreasonably endangered, . . . . that he himself is being exposed to unrea-

33

34
35
36
37
38

39

40

See, e.g., Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1992) (characterizing
ETS exposure as producing a “potential, distant harm” to health and stressing that prisoner displayed no symptoms “different from those suffered by everyone in society”).
See McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991) (detailing procedural history of the case).
Helling, 509 U.S. at 34 (citing Brief, supra note 8, at 20–22).
Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–36.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991) (holding that a prisoner
must show a culpable state of mind on the part of the prison officials to prove an Eighth
Amendment violation based on the conditions of confinement).
See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (establishing the necessity of a subjective inquiry in an Eighth
Amendment analysis by stating that “[t]he infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter”) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985)).
Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
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41

sonably high levels of ETS.” This takes the form of a “scientific and
statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm” and the
42
likelihood of actual harm resulting from the ETS exposure. The
Court noted that the prisoner’s current holding condition is “[p]lainly
43
relevant” to this inquiry. Regulatory mechanisms and policies in
place at the holding facility for minimizing health risks from ETS are
44
also relevant.
All of these factors are intuitive to the inquiry of
whether the prisoner’s exposure to ETS is overwhelming enough to
present a direct danger to his or her future health, and so constitute
an Eighth Amendment violation.
The Helling Court, however, added one more consideration to the
objective prong by requiring a court “to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwilling45
ly to such a risk.” “In other words,” the Court stated, “the prisoner
must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s
46
society chooses to tolerate.” This “social tolerance” prong is long47
standing in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. It serves the important function of ensuring that the construction of the Eighth
Amendment remains in tune with the current practices and know48
ledge of an ever-changing society. In Helling, mandating the fulfillment of the social tolerance prong allowed the Court to send a signal
that ETS had been proven dangerous to health, while remaining conservative by ultimately reserving the exact judgment of the extent of
this danger to “society,” or more likely, the representative branches of
49
government. The social tolerance sub-inquiry theoretically would
ensure that the constitutional standards for ETS exposure in prisons
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (“The [Eighth Amendment] in the
opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice.”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“[W]e have held
repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Kraft, supra note 6, at 279 (“If the Helling Court was to adhere to its limited role in the
U.S. judiciary, it had only one choice: to send a signal to the legislatures and organizations that have the resources, the public support, and the power to address the problem
of ETS.”).
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would remain appropriate in the face of both changes in social attitudes regarding ETS and the future accumulation of knowledge concerning the causal relationship between ETS and future harm.
III. IN A DECADE OF ACCELERATING CHANGE, THE HELLING TEST
BEGINS TO SHOW ITS WEAKNESSES
Eighteen years have passed since the formulation of the Helling
test for determining unreasonable exposure to ETS in prisons. Since
50
the EPA’s classification of ETS as a class A carcinogen in 1993, more
state and local governments gradually began to pass general smoking
51
bans affecting restaurants, bars, and most enclosed workplaces.
Most general statewide bans contain varying numbers of exceptions,
which leads to differential restrictions upon smoking in public spac52
es. However, more than thirty-five states currently have some state53
54
wide form of smoking control in place, with Michigan and Wiscon55
sin having recently joined the more restrictive ranks. The shift is
clear: The public attitude toward smoking in enclosed and public
spaces has shifted from generally permissive to presumptively barred,
56
albeit to different extents according to state law.
In this light, it seems that the flexibility afforded by the Helling
test’s social tolerance prong would work to lessen the extent of ETS
which a prisoner’s holding environment might contain under the
Constitution. In practice, however, the standard seems to have become muddled over time. And most unfortunately, the outcomes of
50

51
52

53

54

55

56

Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Designates Passive Smoking a “Class A” or Known
Human Carcinogen (Jan. 7, 1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/
smoke/01.htm.
Kabat, supra note 1, at 134.
Id. at 135; see also Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=86&cat=2 (last visited May 11,
2011) (detailing the varying exceptions to the smoking bans in different states).
See Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, supra note 52 (finding 35 states with active
public place smoking bans in 2008, including Washington D.C.); cf. Kabat, supra note 1,
at 191–92, 194–99 (listing different levels of smoking bans present in 2008, and considering 25 measures as sufficiently restrictive to constitute “modern statewide bans”).
See Peter Luke, Michigan Workplaces—Including Bars and Restaurants—Will Go Smokefree in
May, MLIVE.COM (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/12/
granholm_gets_smoking_ban_will.html (detailing the recent public smoking ban in
Michigan).
See Stacy Forster Smoking Ban Would Take Effect in July 2010, JS ONLINE (May 6, 2009),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/44464502.html (outlining the recent smoking ban in the state of Wisconsin).
See Kabat, supra note 1, at 130 (“Whereas smoking was previously permitted in public . . . we increasingly live in a country where insular smoking spaces are carved out of a
public domain in which smoking is generally forbidden.”)
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many of the cases which turn on the objective prong of Helling appear
to depend on the confused social tolerance sub-inquiry.
Simmons v. Sager exemplifies a relatively early approach by a court
and is instructive as to why the social tolerance prong has become
57
problematic in this sphere. In this case, the plaintiff prisoner repeatedly asked to be moved to non-smoking quarters, as he had suffered bronchial pneumonia as a child and was susceptible to respira58
tory infections. The court dismissed the case in a short opinion
noting that the prison had extensive policies in place to mitigate the
effects of ETS, and the plaintiff was not suffering from any symptoms
59
of ETS overexposure. The court fully explained its conclusion that
the ETS exposure was not unreasonable by noting that the plaintiff
had not alleged that his childhood respiratory problems had persisted into adulthood, and that the plaintiff had not made any ETS60
related medical complaints while at the prison.
The opinion continued, however, to put forth a familiar argument:
[i]n many places in society, non-smokers must deal unwillingly with ETS
on a daily basis—smoke on others’ clothes or on the motel room
drapes . . . or the defiant smoker in the non-smoking section of the restaurant or bus. These ETS occurrences in the free world are widely tolerated. As society has not yet demanded that all public areas be kept free
of ETS, the court cannot find that society would require prisons to do
61
so.

The resurrection of the argument put forth in the 1993 United States
62
amicus brief to Helling is superfluous to the determination in this
case that the plaintiff, objectively, did not suffer scientifically unreasonable exposure to ETS. Courts’ continued use of this social tolerance standard in the midst of a decade of quickly changing ETS laws
has served only to complicate the task of determining a “reasonable”
amount of ETS exposure, beyond that which might be scientifically
determined.
One complication presented by continued reliance on the social
tolerance inquiry is the difficulty courts will have in citing precedent
as authority on the matter. As public opinion on ETS shifts, a level of
ETS exposure which a court may have found tolerable in the time of
Helling may no longer be considered so. While this appears to be the
57
58
59
60
61
62

Simmons v. Sager, 964 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Va. 1997).
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 212–13.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Brief, supra note 8, at 20.
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Helling rule functioning properly, the inability of a court to strongly
rest on precedent weakens the court’s rulings concerning social tolerance or unreasonable ETS exposure. This disadvantage is particularly relevant in times of rapid change, such as the decade after the
Helling decision. The court in Gill v. Smith noted this difficulty while
laying out precedent relevant to the case at hand: “[W]hile this decision [considered as precedent] remains good law,” the court cautioned, “it may not provide the current and accurate parameters for
judging what levels of exposure to ETS are sufficient to support an
63
Eighth Amendment claim.” The precedent in question, Oliver v.
64
Deen, had been decided seven years earlier, in 1996. The majority of
the precedent the Gill court considered on the issue was hardly more
65
recent. While the difficulty recognized by the Gill court may not be
66
present in every case, it highlights one disadvantage, caused by the
nature of the legal system, of pegging a determination of an individual’s unreasonable exposure to ETS to a conception of the public’s
shifting tolerance for exposure to the carcinogen.
The social tolerance prong of the ETS exposure test also presents
the difficulty of applying a general social standard to judge the impact of a substance on a given individual. In 1998, the court in Scott
67
v. District of Columbia struggled with this very problem. Notably, Scott
serves as an important limitation to Helling by standing for the propo68
sition that prisoners are not entitled to a smoke-free environment.
In the course of the opinion, however, the court wrestled with the
concept of objectively determining the reasonableness of ETS exposure. Particularly relevant is the court’s examination of a plaintiff’s
expert testimony dealing with causative difficulties. The court wrote:
[Plaintiff] failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between his conditions and an increased risk of harm to him from second-hand smoke. Dr.
Munzer’s testimony established no such nexus . . . . Dr. Munzer testified
that the health effects of exposure to second-hand smoke var[y] tremendously with the individual, and in order to assess the actual

63
64
65

66

67
68

Gill v. Smith, 283 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Gill v. Smith, 283 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767–68 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing three cases from
1996, one from 1997, and one from 2000, as well as one case from 2003 concerning only
the proper production of evidence).
See, e.g., Adams v. Banks, 663 F. Supp. 2d 485, 490 (S.D. Miss. 2009) (citing two Fifth Circuit cases decided in the previous year which provided clear guidance on the evidentiary
standard for summary judgment in ETS cases of this type).
Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Dawson
v. District of Columbia, 525 U.S. 851 (1998).
Id. at 943.
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risk . . . [he] would have to be familiar with the plaintiffs’ medical histo69
ries.

Here the court primarily noted the lack of objective, scientific evidence which might have indicated that the plaintiff had been subjected to unreasonable amounts of ETS. The plaintiff’s failure on the
scientific harm sub-inquiry of Helling’s objective prong was dispositive.
However, the conceptual difficulties of the social tolerance subinquiry also began to emerge in this 1998 case. The nature of this inquiry is to take the level of societal ETS tolerance as instructive to an
individual’s complaint of cruel and unusual punishment. The expert
witness for the plaintiffs, absent individual-specific information, clearly hesitated to opine as to the extent of possible effects of ETS upon a
70
prisoner. Dr. Munzer’s professional statement prompts one to question why, if an individual’s reaction to ETS “var[ies] tremendously”
71
according to multiple factors, it is proper to hinge an Eighth
Amendment determination of proper jail conditions upon the hypothetical ETS tolerance of a potentially fractured and uninformed society—a tolerance level which still may be quite harmful for an inmate particularly susceptible to ETS.
This question of propriety is somewhat illuminated by an understanding of the history behind why courts came to apply this social tolerance analysis to Eighth Amendment ETS cases. As mentioned
above, the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment historically applied to a quite different form of treatment. The provision,
72
present in a similar form in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, was
69
70
71

72

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Giorgos S. Metsios et al., A Brief Exposure to Moderate Passive Smoke Increases Metabolism and Thyroid Hormone Secretion, 92 J. CLINICAL. ENDOCRINOLOGY. & METABOLISM
208, 209–11(2007) (finding that ETS exposure at bar/restaurant levels resulted in
decrements in gonadal hormones for both sexes and marked increases in thyroid hormone secretion and systolic blood pressure in men); Brian W. P. Seymour et al, SecondHand Smoke Increases Bronchial Hyperreactivity and Eosinophilia in a Murine Model of Allergic
Aspergillosis, 10 CLINICAL & DEV. IMMUNOLOGY 35, 41 (2003) (finding that ETS can cause
exacerbation of asthma, demonstrated by functional airway hyper-responsiveness and elevated levels of blood eosinophilia); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 669 (2006), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
secondhandsmoke/report/fullreport.pdf (“As understanding increases regarding health
consequences from even brief exposures to secondhand smoke, it becomes even clearer
that the health of nonsmokers overall, and particularly the health of children, individuals
with existing heart and lung problems, and other vulnerable populations, requires a
higher priority and greater protection.”).
THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL ARGUMENTS AND FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENTS
57–60 (Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., 1998); see English Bill of Rights of 1689, reprinted in Carl Stephenson & Frank Marcham, Sources of Constitutional History (1937).
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included primarily to prevent torture and barbarous forms of capital
73
punishment. The Eighth Amendment was therefore largely con74
cerned with present forms of extreme physical and mental harm. At
the time, however, the Eighth Amendment was rarely used to prevent
75
this type of harm. But in 1910, the Supreme Court envisioned the
Eighth Amendment as having a broader application, and it extended
Eighth Amendment construction to cover proportionality of punish76
ment to the crime committed. This philosophy of a broad and progressive mode of interpretation has persisted, and Helling represents
the extension of this principle to a type of harm—latent and causally
unclear, caused by an agent common in society—previously not con77
templated by Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the recognition of ETS exposure as a potential “cruel and unusual punish78
ment” was vigorously opposed not only by the Helling dissenters but
79
also by commentators.
When the Supreme Court expanded Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to this new form of punishment, it necessarily brought
along the modes of analysis which it had developed to judge the cir80
cumstances previously recognized as forms of punishment.
The
Court did not alter the existing jurisprudence to accommodate its
novel and progressive decision. Therefore, a court must go beyond
“a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential
73

74
75
76

77
78

79

80

See also Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 376 (1995) (tracing in part the development of
the judicial construction of cruel and unusual punishment). See generally Celia Rumann,
Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP.
L. REV. 661, 673 (2004) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment squarely applies to interrogation torture).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
Gutterman, supra note 73, at 376.
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Time works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”).
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
Id. at 37–38 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (“Today the Court expands the Eighth Amendment
in yet another direction, holding that it applies to a prisoner’s mere risk of injury . . . . This decision . . . rests on the premise that deprivations suffered by a prisoner
constitute ‘punishmen[t]’ for Eighth Amendment purposes, even when the deprivations
have not been inflicted as part of a criminal sentence . . . . I have serious doubts about
this premise.”).
See, e.g., Kane, supra note 4, at 1400 (arguing that Helling’s construction of the Eighth
Amendment gives prisoners rights beyond those held by citizens in society); Sara L. Rose,
Comment, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Need Not Be Cruel, Unusual, or Punishment, 24
CAP. U. L. REV. 827, 828 (1995) (taking issue with the broad construction of the Eighth
Amendment and the analyses developed).
See generally Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–36.
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harm and the likelihood that such injury to health [of the individual]
will actually be caused by exposure to ETS,” and question society’s to81
lerance of this health risk. Since the Court shoehorned ETS cases
into an existing mode of analysis, the question of whether the standard social tolerance inquiry might become problematic, outmoded,
or conceptually improper was either marginalized, overlooked, or left
to be resolved in the future.
IV. BEYOND LEGAL DIFFICULTIES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH
RETAINING AN INDEPENDENT SOCIAL TOLERANCE INQUIRY
The discovery of procedural and ethical difficulties with the application of a social tolerance analysis of Eighth Amendment ETS cases
warrants a closer look at the problem. This Comment is concerned
with the practical and ethical inconsistencies inherent in determining
an imprisoned individual’s right to be free from unreasonable exposure to a class A carcinogen based on a mass and diffuse third party’s
opinion of how tolerable exposure to that carcinogen might be. After further exploring the nature of the problem, this Comment will
propose positive and practical steps judiciaries can take to improve
the uncomfortable marriage of ETS case facts and traditional Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, for both judiciaries and plaintiffs.
First, there is a practical difficulty in the idea of determining the
appropriate extent of safeguards for an individual’s health based on
the opinion of a large and divided society. It is important that a court
does not appear to make a determination of public tolerance of ETS
in a manner susceptible to criticisms of being merely ad hoc. Looking to state legislation may be some indication of how firm the public
stance is on a certain issue. But ETS legislation may not necessarily
be a sound reflection of exactly what society thinks of that issue.
Such legislation is a particularly unsuitable basis upon which to judge
a matter of gradation, like ETS exposure. While the social tolerance
inquiry is squarely suitable for questions of whether a certain practice
or procedure is acceptable—dragging a condemned prisoner to the
82
hanging site, for example—it seems unclear exactly how a judge can

81
82

Id. at 36.
See Jonathan H. Vold, Note, The Eighth Amendment “Punishment” Clause after Helling v.
McKinney: Four Terms, Two Standards, and a Search for Definition, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 215,
220 (1994) (outlining early practices barred under the Eighth Amendment, including
dragging condemned prisoners to the hanging site, “burning at the stake, crucifixion,
and breaking on the wheel”).
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determine whether a given society deems a certain amount of smoke
exposure to be tolerable.
For all of the discussion above regarding changing social attitudes
about ETS, there is hardly a firm consensus amongst state legislatures
83
on the proper limits of ETS restrictions. This is problematic, again,
because the inquiry is one of scale, not of existence. Courts are also
faced with the difficulty of determining the proper weight to give leg84
islation or executive orders and reports. Further conceptual difficulties arise because many of the regulations that do exist are ultimately products of intense lobbying efforts from both sides of the
85
issue. The bans therefore often contain exclusions and inclusions of
86
all types. This result would seem to indicate the effectiveness of industry lobbyists more than any consensus of the people of a given
state whether, for example, it is acceptable to allow smoking in tobac87
co lounges but not in bars.
Even were legislation assumed to be accurately reflective of society’s tolerance for a certain level of ETS exposure, a final layer of practical difficulty in determining the tolerance of society for ETS is that
the subject at issue, tobacco, is imbued in our historical and cultural
88
consciousness. This is a basic difference from the traditional subjects of the inquiry—modes of torture, capital punishment, and dis89
proportionate legal penalties. As a result, even in the case of strong
anti-ETS legislation there are likely significant minority interests not
reflected in the final legislation.
Two disconcerting ethical problems accompany the above practical difficulties of the social tolerance Helling sub-inquiry. At its most
basic level, the inquiry works to turn the individual prisoner into the
construct of an average person in society, who withstands exposure to
83
84

85
86
87
88

89

See Kabat, supra note 1, at 137 (classifying states into five groups, each with their own internal differentiation, according to rigidity of ETS restrictions).
See, e.g., Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 265 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The dissent characterizes this reference [to an Executive Order banning smoking in state buildings] as an attempt to form a societal consensus from a single state regulation. However, we refer to
the regulation merely to show that Atkinson has offered some proof of a societal consensus. Proof of a national consensus might include, inter alia, the federal regulation which
protects the public and federal employees from ETS in all federal workplaces . . . .”).
Kabat, supra note 1, at 131, 165–70.
See Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, supra note 52.
See generally Kabat, supra note 1, at 179–84 (discussing the lack of advocates for tobacco
lounges that can “asses their proper place within ETS regimes).
See generally ALTERING AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS: THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG
USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800–2000 (Sarah W. Tracy & Caroline Jean Acker eds. 2004)
(discussing the histories of different drugs in America, including tobacco and alcohol).
See Vold, supra note 82, at 219–20 (tracing the background and development of the construction of “punishment” contained in the Eighth Amendment).
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ETS accordingly. The problem, as noted above, is that susceptibility
90
to ETS exposure “var[ies] tremendously with the individual.” While
it is true that prisoners give up some rights and privileges because of
their crimes against society, individual status should not be one of
them when the characteristic being glossed over is susceptibility to a
class A carcinogen.
The potential ramifications of the Helling test, when viewed in this
light, are somewhat unsettling. The Helling Court put forth the scientific reasonableness and social tolerance components of the objective
prong as conjunctive factors, necessitating a finding of both for the
91
claim to succeed on this basis. Accordingly, a prisoner with very
high sensitivity to ETS could suffer scientifically unreasonable exposure to ETS yet lose his claim on Helling's objective prong if a court
determined that the statistical measure of ETS exposure in that case
would be tolerated by society. The inequity of this possibility—or at
least puzzlement as to why this could be the case—demonstrates the
value of a new approach to the social tolerance prong of prison ETS
exposure cases.
With the current analysis, not only is the consideration of a prisoner’s health-related treatment being outsourced to society, but so is
the extent of his or her constitutional right to safe conditions of con92
finement. Again, the source of the difficulty lies in the nature of the
subject being judged; if this were a question of an acutely harmful
event, one’s rights would likely be clearer, and the danger of an over93
riding “social opinion” less. For example, one’s right to not be assaulted is well-recorded throughout the country, a point which is not
94
seriously disputed. Accordingly, courts have held that prisoners assaulted by guards, or even placed in a position in which they are likely
95
to be assaulted by others, are entitled to Eighth Amendment relief.
90
91

92

93
94
95



See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35–36 (1993) (“With respect to the objective factor,
McKinney must show that he himself is being exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS
. . . . Also with respect to the objective factor, determining whether McKinney’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires more than a scientific and
statistical inquiry . . . .”).
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (discussing the duty imposed by the Constitution upon the state to assume responsibility to protect the safety of a prisoner); Youngberg v Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (considering the unconstitutionality of placing convicted criminals and the involuntarily
committed in unsafe conditions).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985) (defining different types of assault).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1992) (declaring excessive force against prisoner as definitively falling under Eighth Amendment auspices); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
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Since the activity considered is relatively uncommon and never tolerated, the individual’s right seems to be in all cases coextensive with
those in society. A similar, neat result occurs when analyzing a tradi96
tional Eighth Amendment subject, like torture. But when the externalities of smoking are considered, the same analysis becomes
97
blurred because it is a common activity long tolerated, and only re98
cently restricted in common areas to varying degrees. In this case,
pegging the prisoner’s right to an idea of the public tolerance for
ETS is bound to be subject to dissonant results. Does a prisoner in
Utah have greater constitutional protection than a prisoner in North
99
Carolina? Did the extent of a Michigan prisoner’s constitutional
100
While affirmative answers to these quesrights alter in May 2010?
tions would seem absurd, determinations of the public’s tolerance of
ETS exposure by some other, more nebulous calculation may be seriously challenged as forming an ad hoc legal standard. In light of
current scientific knowledge about ETS and its direct effects, the extent of a prisoner’s rights should simply not be determined based on
the outcome of a clouded analysis concerning social tolerance.
V. AMENDING JURISPRUDENCE: SUGGESTED PRACTICAL ALTERATIONS
TO EIGHTH AMENDMENT ETS CASE ANALYSIS
It is not feasible to simply do away with the public tolerance inquiry. As stated, this is an important and traditional component of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The inquiry has sometimes offered a positive and valuable way to look at ETS cases around the
time of the Helling decision. It has allowed, and may still allow, shifts
in public sentiment to effectively substitute for absolute causative certainty. This extra flexibility in the objective Helling prong allowed
courts to lower the evidentiary standard for causation and afford
greater protection to prisoners who, by similar facts, may not have

96
97
98
99

100

559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prisoner need not actually be assaulted before
gaining relief). Note that both of these cases were decided before Helling.
See generally Rumann, supra note 73 (analyzing the Eighth Amendment as it relates to torture).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, supra note 52 (detailing variations of public
smoking bans in place in 2008).
Utah has one of the strictest public smoking bans in the nation, while North Carolina is
the most permissive state when it comes to public smoking. See Kabat, supra note 1, at
138, 144–45.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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been given constitutional protection only a few years earlier. Absolute scientific certainty of causation between ETS and a given illness,
or likelihood of a future illness, may ultimately be unattainable. Presently, however, a solely scientific and statistical inquiry should legally
suffice to establish both probable ETS causation of harm and the appropriate Eighth Amendment threshold of harm. The heightened
scientific consensus of the positive harmful effects of ETS and the recent social shift from permissive of public smoking to presumptively
102
intolerant of ETS together signal the arrival of a critical point at
which the “public tolerance” inquiry of Helling may be functionally
dispatched. Doing so both simplifies the inquiry and brings it into
proper consonance with an ethical analysis.
This Comment proposes a simple and not wholly unprecedented
method to achieve the above, the adoption of which would not tamper with a court’s essential reasoning or final decision. By merging
the two objective Helling inquiries, courts can signal a tougher stance
on compelled ETS exposure in prisons, recognize that ETS exposure
is highly consequential, and avoid determining the extent of a prisoner's right to a healthy environment by referencing a narrow approximation of society's tolerance for ETS exposure. As a result of
such a merger, a finding of social intolerance would as a matter of
course follow a determination of scientifically unreasonable ETS exposure.
Merging the inquiries of whether the prisoner has been subjected
to an unreasonable amount of ETS and whether society would be tolerant of the amount of exposure would be a judicial signal that compelled exposure to unreasonably high level of ETS is per se intolera103
ble and deserving of a remedy. By this construction, a court would
no longer have to go beyond the “scientific and statistical inquiry into
the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS,” as Helling

101

102
103

Compare Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 161 (7th Cir. 1996) (granting summary judgment for
defendants where the plaintiff, a mild asthmatic, was housed with a smoker for 133 days)
with McPherson v. Coombe, 29 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting defendant’s summary judgment as to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim while denying summary
judgment as to plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claims, where the plaintiff was housed with
41 smokers in a poorly ventilated housing unit, because of factual questions as to whether
smoke conditions in the prison violated contemporary standards of decency).
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
Cf. Kabat, supra note 1, at 175–77 (characterizing courts as unable and imprudent to undertake changes to law, and it is up to the legislatures and other organizations to address
the problems of ETS).
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104

mandated in 1993. Granted, the Helling Court’s direction to do so
has become quite venerated in cases of this type, as it is directly
quoted in most of the cases relevant to this Comment. But merging
the inquiries is not to do away with one or the other. It would simply
be judicial recognition that, broadly, the idea of compelled exposure
to unreasonably high levels of ETS has become intolerable to society
105
generally. This presumption, which the defendant would carry the
burden of disproving, is justified by a majority of states having
106
Past cases and current attitudes inadopted public smoking bans.
dicate, however, that the presumption would rarely be overcome.
Courts have previously explored the idea of merging the inquiries
in different ways. The most radical of these, since overruled, came in
107
Crowder v. District of Columbia.
In Crowder, the court ruled that any
108
exposure to ETS was per se intolerable and unreasonable. Beyond
simply being an illustration of a court’s willingness to consider functionally dispatching the social tolerance inquiry—though by a much
more extreme means in this case—Crowder instantiates the previously
mentioned difficulties of looking to legislation for a determination of
social ETS tolerance. In expressing a prisoner’s right to a smoke-free
environment, the court explicitly looked to legislation in the District
109
of Columbia for authority. In that jurisdiction, the legislature had
110
extensively recognized the harms of ETS.
The contention that
mere exposure to ETS was significantly harmful, however, was still a
litigable issue; in fact, the District of Columbia “request[ed] the
Court to go along with . . . [the District’s] repudiation [in its brief] of

104
105

106

107
108

109
110

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 71, at 667 (“Since 1986, the attitude of the public toward and the social norms
around secondhand smoke exposure have changed dramatically to reflect a growing
viewpoint that the involuntary exposure of nonsmokers to secondhand smoke is unacceptable.”).
About half of the states also currently ban tobacco use in their prisons in an effort to reduce health care costs; several others have partial bans in place. These prison-specific
bans further justify a presumption that unreasonable exposure to ETS in prison is per se
intolerable. See Andrew M. Seaman, States with Tobacco-Free Prisons, USA TODAY (Mar. 25,
2010, 12:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-24-prison-smokingban_N.htm.
Crowder v. District of Columbia, 959 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997).
Id. at 8 n.6 (finding any exposure to tobacco smoke, whether from the same room or
from an adjacent area, intolerable, by reference to D.C. legislative findings) rev’d sub nom
Scott v. D.C., 139 F.3d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the notion that prisoners have
a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment). See generally Kane, supra note 4 (arguing that Helling v. McKinney grants prisoners the right to a smoke-free environment).
Crowder, 959 F. Supp at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
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its prior [legislative] findings concerning the ill-effects of second111
In light of current knowledge, a state is less likely
hand smoke.”
now to take such a hypocritical position on its own ETS laws when
seeking to establish the applicable social tolerance standard. The developed state of social knowledge and attitudes concerning ETS exposure should, however, similarly encourage courts to take a fresh
look at the approach to ETS exposure litigation.
While the Crowder decision did overreach, the general trend toward presumptive intolerance of ETS can be a sufficient basis for recognizing unreasonable exposure to ETS in prison as per se intolerable.
Only such a single, broad determination is appropriate to ensure that
prisoners of all states and districts have equally clear rights to a
healthy environment. As this Comment has argued, knowledge and
public opinion have reached a critical point at which this determination has become politically and judicially feasible. No inquiry past
that of unreasonable exposure to ETS should be formally necessary,
because litigation over the public tolerance of such a scientific and
statistical determination is superfluous, duplicative, and unethical.
The suggestion of this Comment to functionally merge the two
objective Helling inquiries is not as extreme as the 1997 Crowder decision. Rather, it walks the line between similar, accepted jurisprudence concerning asbestos exposure and the current practice of conducting both inquiries. Courts have held that prisoners who have
asbestos exposure claims can establish, first, that “a reasonable person
would have understood that exposing an inmate to friable asbestos
112
could violate the Eighth Amendment.”
Second, the plaintiff may
advance the theory that “the right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, established in Estelle v. Gamble, best
encompasses the alleged conduct” of knowingly exposing the prison113
er to friable asbestos.
Asbestos and ETS are both class A carcinogens, substances known
114
to cause cancer in humans.
It is therefore not extraordinary to
treat them similarly in a legal sense; the analysis simply becomes a
matter of degrees. Since smoking, as noted, is traditional in some

111
112
113
114

Id. at 9. The court responded: “This Court declines to accept the District’s unwise and
indeed unconscionable position.” Id.
LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. (citation omitted).
See Known and Probable Human Carcinogens, AMER. CANCER SOC’Y http://www.cancer.org/
docroot/PED/content/PED_1_3x_Known_and_Probable_Carcinogens.asp (last updated
Feb. 17, 2011) (listing all currently known, and potential, carcinogens).
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115

sense and imbued in our national consciousness, it is politically and
socially preferable to restrain the standard to one of reasonableness
116
In LaBounty v. Coughlin, the
rather than complete extirpation.
Court used the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”
117
reasoning of Estelle to avoid any inquiry into public tolerance of as118
Merging the objective Helling inquiries theoretibestos exposure.
cally removes an evidentiary barrier for a prisoner to withstand sum119
mary judgment on an ETS exposure case, somewhat replicating
Labounty. This Comment does not argue for courts to analyze ETS
cases by the Estelle and LaBounty application of “serious medical need”
upon mere exposure—there is no constitutional right to a smoke-free
120
atmosphere.
The more moderate merged inquiry analysis in this
case recognizes only the right to be free from exposure to ETS of such
a level that it would cause a serious medical need.
Recently, courts have demonstrated a willingness to shift evidentiary burdens in light of increased knowledge of the harms of ETS
121
exposure. Notably, the holdings in question also remove the social
115
116
117
118
119

120
121



See generally ALTERING AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS: THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG
USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800–2000, supra note 88 at 2–3, 383–401.
Hence the reversal of Crowder v. District of Columbia, 959 F. Supp. 6 (D. D.C. 1997) by Scott
v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
See LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to undertake the social
tolerance inquiry).
If not technically lowering the standard, then procedurally lowering it by not requiring
plaintiffs, many of whom are pro se, to submit evidence that their ETS exposure was of a
level that the public would not tolerate in addition to evidence that such exposure was unreasonable; pro se litigants seem to often neglect the inclusion of the former type of evidence, perhaps because it is unintuitive to do so—however venerated or traditional the
inquiry. See, e.g., Judge Castel, Court Rejects Disabled Prisoners’ Second-Hand Smoke Claims
Arising Before Prison’s Indoor Smoking Ban, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 2005, at 21–22 (“Plaintiffs have
failed, in opposition to defendants’ motion, to present any evidence that they were exposed to levels of ETS so harmful that ‘it is contrary to current standards of decency for
anyone to be so exposed against his will.’ Plaintiffs’ pro se status, while implicating a
more liberal interpretation of their pleadings, does not excuse them from the burden of
coming forward with concrete evidence . . . . Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the objective prong of plaintiff’s pre-2001 ETS claim.” (citations omitted)).
See Scott, 139 F.3d at 142.
See Perkins v. Terrell, No. 08–CV–1906, 2010 WL 5488234, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 6, 2010)
(adopting objective standard hold[ing] that there is “no safe level of or exposure to
second hand smoke” in denying summary judgment to defendant) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hicks v. Corrections Corp. of Am., No. 08–CV–0687–A, 2009 WL
2969768, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2009) (denying summary judgment to defendant based
on evidence adopted from 2006 Surgeon General’s Report finding “no safe level of or
exposure to second hand smoke”); Sivori v. Epps, No. 2:07–CV–79–MTP, 2009 WL
799463, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2009) (applying a heightened standard to find objective
Helling prong satisfied by prolonged ETS exposure for the purposes of withstanding
summary judgment); see also Fisher v. Caruso, No. 03–CV–71804–DT, 2006 WL 2711807 at
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tolerance evidentiary burden for plaintiffs seeking to avoid summary
judgment. In these recent cases courts have taken judicial notice of a
2006 Surgeon General’s Report (the “2006 Report”) which concluded that “scientific evidence indicates that there is no risk-free lev122
el of exposure to secondhand smoke.”
The report further found
that “[s]ince 1986, the attitude of the public toward . . . secondhand
smoke exposure [has] changed dramatically to reflect a growing
viewpoint that the involuntary exposure of nonsmokers to second123
hand smoke is unacceptable.” The Surgeon General’s findings are
clear on both the scientific harm of ETS and the shift in public opinion concerning involuntary ETS exposure.
By adopting the 2006 Report, these courts have found the objective Helling prong to be fully satisfied, for the purposes of withstanding summary judgment when a plaintiff merely shows prolonged ex124
posure to ETS. Upon the finding of prolonged exposure, the court
125
further presumes that the public would not tolerate such exposure.
The defendant has an opportunity to rebut the presumption that the
126
exposure at issue occurred and is harmful. Given the state of everincreasing knowledge of the harms of ETS and the steady trend away
from ETS tolerance, it appears likely that this type of approach will
become more prevalent in the years ahead.
Merging the objective Helling inquiries operates in the same vein
as the aforementioned approach and preserves its reasoning through

122
123
124

125
126

*13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2006) (denying summary judgment to defendant by adopting
finding of 2006 report that “[s]eparating smokers and nonsmokers in the same airspace is
not effective, nor is air cleaning or a greater exchange of indoor with outdoor air”).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 71, at 11; see also supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 71, at 667.
See Perkins, 2010 WL 5488234, at *3 (adopting objective standard hold[ing] that there is
“no safe level of or exposure to second hand smoke” in denying summary judgment to
defendant) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hicks, 2009 WL 2969768, at *6–7 (“Accordingly, this court accepts the scientific evidence in the Surgeon General’s 2006 Report
as meeting the objective component of Helling, as well as Helling’s requirement of a showing that society considers the risk to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of
decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk, as also set forth in the Surgeon General’s report . . . . [Plaintiff’s] evidence shows he was exposed to second hand smoke almost 24 hours a day every day, and the defendants have not refuted that.”); Sivori, 2009
WL 799463, at *7 (looking to a heightened standard to find objective Helling prong satisfied by prolonged ETS exposure for the purposes of withstanding summary judgment).
Hicks, 2009 WL 2969768, at *6–7.
See id. at 6 (“The court takes judicial notice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 201, that the
United States Surgeon General’s June 2006 report concluded that scientific evidence
shows there is no safe level of or exposure to second hand smoke. Of course, defendants
may dispute the Surgeon General’s report and conclusions pursuant to the procedures
set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 201.”).
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the trial stage. If prolonged exposure can be sufficient to satisfy Helling’s objective prong on both inquiries to withstand summary judgment, so should scientifically unreasonable exposure suffice to satisfy the
objective prong in its entirety at any stage. The adoption of the 2006
Report provides the necessary evidence to tie together the concepts
of unreasonable and intolerable levels of exposure.
Indeed, tying these concepts together at either the summary
judgment or trial stage would appear to be more judicially conservative than the approach used in the line of cases citing Hicks. Unlike
the reasoning used in the aforementioned cases, merging the inqui127
ries does not in itself create a heightened standard for air quality.
Only a showing of scientifically unreasonable exposure would obviate
the inquiry into public tolerance. Furthermore, the same conclusion
drawn from the 2006 Report and inferred from surveying state laws—
that public opinion has evolved to the point where compulsory exposure to unreasonable levels of ETS is not tolerated—would apply at
all stages of litigation.
Accordingly, upon a merger of the objective inquiries, litigation
concerning the objective analysis of Eighth Amendment ETS expo128
sure cases would become primarily scientific and statistical.
No
formal inquiry into public tolerance would be made by this construction unless the defendant challenged the presumption that the public would not tolerate the exposure in question. The general move by
a majority of states to restrict ETS exposure in public warrants a presumption that the public would be unwilling that anyone be exposed,
compulsorily, to a scientifically dangerous level of ETS. By this synthesis of existing tests and standards, the analytical treatment of
Eighth Amendment ETS exposure in prison cases would remain le129
gally consistent with the test put forth in Helling while becoming
philosophically, ethically, and intuitively consonant, thereby eliminating an unintuitive evidentiary hurdle for pro se litigants in the
process.
127

128

129

Cf. Perkins, 2010 WL 5488234, at *6 (discussing and “[a]pplying the heightened standard
as adopted vis-à-vis the Surgeon General’s Report” that the Hicks court had applied in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
Cf. Helling v. Mckinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (“[D]etermining whether McKinney’s
conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires more than a scientific
and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that
such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS. It also requires a court
to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a
risk.”).
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that compelled exposure
to environmental tobacco smoke could constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it required plaintiffs to
show not only a scientific likelihood of harm, but also that the public
130
would not tolerate the exposure at issue.
Public opinion on the
harmfulness of environmental tobacco smoke has changed drastically
since that time. In the years following Helling, state legislatures quickly moved to recognize the public’s intolerance of ETS exposure by
passing laws greatly restricting public smoking. The resulting con131
sensus that ETS exposure is not widely tolerated in public areas
warrants an equally broad presumption that the public frowns upon
compelled exposure to scientifically unreasonable amounts of ETS
132
when experienced by anyone, including prisoners. Courts that continue to actively inquire into the social tolerance of ETS exposure fail
to acknowledge the incredible steps taken by legislatures, in response
to scientific advancements and shifting public opinion, to curb public
133
smoking. Ultimately, it is untenable to hinge a prisoner’s right to a
safe living environment on such an external, variable, and now irrelevant factor. Because the scientific and public opinions of the harms
of considerable ETS exposure have crystallized, the time has come to
functionally dispatch with the social tolerance inquiry the Helling
Court put forth eighteen years ago.
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Id.
See Kabat, supra note 1 (compiling data on public smoking bans and arguing that exposure to ETS has become presumptively intolerable).
See Helling, 509 U.S. at 36 (“It also requires a court to assess whether society considers the
risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards
of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”).
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

